From Object to Animated “Thing”: the Disenchantment of the Object

An “object,” like an animal, possesses a dual nature: anthropological, when defined as an artifact, and poetic when posited as a metaphor, symbol, or allegory. It appears, then, as the embodiment or image of the “Other,” that which human beings confront in their understanding of the world. For its part, the “animated” qualifier harkens etymologically to anima, whose two meanings of “soul” and “animal” served in Classical philosophy to make distinctions between living beings and to place them in hierarchical order. Thus conceived, the “animated object” can be an instrument of thought for conceptualizing the difference between nature and culture, human and non-human, subject and object. While art history may not have given much attention to the animated object — distinct from the “animated image” 1 1  - David Freedberg, The Power of Images: Studies in the History and Theory of Response (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1989).— discourses in anthropology, psychology, literature, and film have taught us to consider the dialectical relationship between subject and animated object as being typically unidirectional: human beings, projecting their fantasies and desires, humanize objects and endow them with a soul. Animism, denoting an inclination to attribute properties of the living to inanimate objects, exemplifies precisely this one-way relationship. Generally dismissed in modern thought,2 2  - Ibid. the concept allows us nonetheless to consider Western literature’s strong influence (through its descriptions and metaphors) on the perception (even the apprehension) of the object’s effectiveness.

Partaking in the renewed interest in the animated object are recent studies in Thing Theory. Contrary to animist thought, this theory emphasizes the primacy of dialogical relationships between the object and the one perceiving it. Moreover, of particular interest in the context of the “material turn” in visual culture is the importance of the everyday object in current artistic production. Thus, I propose we reconsider a recurring object in these practices — namely, the chair — in light of theories on “the thing.”